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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
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Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
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* The Clerk is directed to amend the caption to reflect the 
correct spelling of the appellant’s name. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
A claim that a search was unconstitutional accrues when the 
officer conducts the search, not when a court later declares it 
unconstitutional. So the statute of limitations runs from the 
time of the search, not the time of the court decision. 
Here, Tam Thanh Nguyen sued Pennsylvania State Trooper 
Jared Bromberg for a 2012 search and arrest, but only after a 
2015 Pennsylvania court decision held that search unconstitu-
tional. Nguyen’s suit thus arrives more than a year late and is 
time-barred, so we will affirm. 
3 
I. FACTS 
In January 2012, Nguyen caught a ride home from a New 
Year’s party with his friend, David Kung. Around 3:15 a.m., 
Trooper Bromberg and his partner clocked the car driving 18 
miles per hour over the speed limit. After tailing the car for a 
bit, they pulled it over.  
Bromberg checked Kung’s license and registration as well 
as Nguyen’s ID. Bromberg asked Kung to step out of the car, 
talked with him briefly, gave him a warning, and said he was 
free to go. Both started to return to their cars. But the trooper 
had second thoughts because Kung was nervous and because 
his check of Nguyen’s ID revealed his history of drug arrests. 
So Bromberg turned around and began to question Kung again. 
Bromberg asked for permission to search the car, and Kung 
consented. Bromberg then asked Nguyen to step out of the car 
and asked him to consent to a pat-down. Nguyen consented. 
The pat-down revealed a cellphone, a large bundle of cash, and 
small baggies of pills. Nguyen admitted that the pills were Ox-
yContin. So Bromberg arrested Nguyen. A search incident to 
arrest turned up bags of powder cocaine and jars of crack co-
caine.  
Pennsylvania prosecuted him, and Nguyen moved to sup-
press the drugs. Commonwealth v. Nguyen, 116 A.3d 657, 662 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). The trial court denied the motion, but the 
appeals court reversed, holding that the search violated the 
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 669. The court reasoned that, by 
reengaging Kung, Bromberg had seized him anew, and that this 
second seizure required its own justification (beyond the initial 
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speeding violation). Id. It found no reasonable suspicion for the 
second seizure, so it held the seizure and resulting search of 
Nguyen unconstitutional. Id. Pennsylvania then dismissed the 
charges. 
A few months later, in September 2015, Nguyen sued Brom-
berg under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserted that, by stopping the 
car, searching him, and arresting him, Bromberg had (1) con-
ducted an unreasonable search and seizure, and (2) made a 
false arrest, both in violation of Nguyen's Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
The District Court granted Bromberg’s motion for summary 
judgment. Ngyuen v. Pennsylvania, No. 15-5082, 2017 WL 
5113229, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2017). It reasoned that Brom-
berg’s search and arrest comported with the Fourth Amend-
ment; that even if it did not, qualified immunity applied; and 
that the statute of limitations barred Nguyen’s claims. Id. at *4. 
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Thomas 
v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). 
II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS FROM THE TIME 
OF THE SEARCH 
We need not address Nguyen’s Fourth Amendment or qual-
ified immunity claims because his suit is untimely.  
Section 1983 has no statute of limitations of its own, but 
borrows the statute of limitations from state personal-injury 
torts. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). So Pennsyl-
vania’s two-year limitations period for personal injuries gov-
erns. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); 42 Pa. 
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Cons. Stat. § 5524(2). Nguyen thus had two years to file this 
suit. 
Up to this point, the parties agree. But Nguyen argues that 
the limitations period began to run when the Pennsylvania 
court held the search unconstitutional, not when the search 
happened. We disagree. 
Federal law, not state law, determines when a limitations pe-
riod begins to run. Kach, 589 F.3d at 634. Under federal law, 
the statute of limitations runs from the moment that a claim 
accrues. Id. And a claim accrues when the last act needed to 
complete the tort occurs. Id. For a search, that is the moment 
of the search. For a false arrest, that is the moment when legal 
process justifies the detention or, absent legal process, the mo-
ment of release. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390-91. 
Here, the last act was Bromberg’s search of Nguyen, not the 
Pennsylvania court decision invalidating the search. And Ngu-
yen was charged and held over for legal process that same day. 
So the causes of action accrued, and the limitations period be-
gan to run, in January 2012. Two years from then is January 
2014. So Nguyen’s suit, filed in September 2015, came a year 
and a half too late. 
Finally, Nguyen has not sought to toll the limitations period. 
So his claim is time-barred. We will affirm. 
